Life is full of dangers and judicial prose…

A Sideways Glance to the Court of Appeal decision in

 

Kandaurova

V

 Circle K Energy Group Ltd

 

Brilliant.

The opening to Noonan J’s Court of Appeal judgment this week in the case of Kandaurova v Cirkle K Energy Group Ltd. was brilliantly effective, reminiscent of the vivid staccato style often associated with Lord Denning in his pomp. To Denning, the writing of judgments was an art form.  And the beginning mattered:

I try to make my judgments live … I start my judgment, as it were, with a prologue – as the chorus does in one of Shakespeare’s plays – to introduce the story.

Professor James Raymond, former Professor of Rhetoric at the University of Alabama, maintained that the first page of a judgment is “prime real estate.” In a well-constructed judgment, “the front page says it all.”

 

Danger here

In Kandaurova, Noonan J opened as follows;

Life is full of dangers which may cause injury if not avoided.  Small children develop by encountering and learning to avoid things that can be fallen off, bumped into, tripped over or knocked down.  In the common law of occupiers’ liability, ordinary everyday dangers are described as “usual” and as such, do not attract liability

The reader is given a simple and direct introduction to the case. The direction of the wind is clear. People can be injured due to danger, but where it is a usual or common danger, there may not be a liability. In this case, a lady tripped on a kerb. It was not defective. The Court of Appeal held that she could not recover damages from the Occupier.

 

The Bluebell opening

There are other fine examples of opening paragraphs in Personal Injury cases. Denning’s ‘Bluebell opening’ is perhaps the most celebrated;

It happened on the 19th April, 1964. It was bluebell time in Kent, Mr. and Mrs. Hinz had been married some 10 years, and they had four children, all aged 9 and under. The youngest was one. Mrs. Minz was a remarkable woman. In addition to her own four, she was foster-mother to four other children. To add to it, she was two months pregnant with her fifth child.

On this day they drove out in a Bedford Dormobile van from Tonbridge to Canvey Island. They took all eight children with them. As they were coming back they turned into a lay by at Thurnham to have a picnic tea. The husband, Mr. Hinz, was at the back of the Dormobile making the tea. Mrs. Hinz had taken Stephanie, her third child, aged 3, across the road to pick bluebells on the opposite side. There came along a Jaguar car driven by Mr. Berry, out of control. A tyre had burst. The Jaguar rushed into this layby and crashed into Mr. Hinz and the children. Mr. Hinz was frightfully injured and died a little later. Nearly all the children were hurt. Blood was streaming from their heads. Mrs. Hinz, hearing the crash, turned round and saw this disaster. She ran across the road and did all she could. Her husband was beyond recall. But the children recovered.

 

Home Run

This blog has previously written of the Irish case of Kane v Kennedy and Budd J’s tremendously evocative :

The news of the death of Joe DiMaggio came while I was writing this judgment. His record streak in 1941, when he got a hit in fifty-six consecutive games, still stands. His grace at the plate and his defensive qualities at centre field, his leadership of the New York Yankees to victory in nine of the ten World Series in which he led them, and above all his gentlemanly conduct made him a legend in his own lifetime. I wonder what he would have made of the problems with which I have been confronted in resolving the conflicts of evidence presented by what followed the strike by Alice Dunne during the game of rounders played in the sports hall of a convent school in Glasnevin on the morning of Tuesday 21st May 1996.

 

Life and Death

One of the first Constitutional cases this reader encountered was the X Case (1992). This form Denham J:

This application for an injunction raises issues of the utmost seriousness affecting a girl of 14 years of age and her family. It concerns matters of life and death, and touches on the deepest aspects of human experience and the moral and legal norms of our Justice.

 

Short and Sweet

Lord Hoffmann’s opening to his judgment in the case Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society could not have been in plainer language;

My Lords, I have had the advantage of reading in draft the speech prepared by my noble and learned friend, Lord Lloyd of Berwick. I agree with it, and for the reasons which he has given, I would allow the appeal.

 

Signal of Intent

Lord Wilberforce in Anns v Merton London Borough Council got straight to the point with:

In my opinion the time has come when we should say that the law ought to recognise our responsibility going beyond the present cases, a duty to behave conscientiously, responsibly and with humanity.

 

Lunar Law

For the property lawyers out there, what about I leave you with this from our Supreme Court and Higgins CJ in Vone Securities Ltd v. Cooke:

As stated by Mr. Justice Costello in his Judgment, at common law the ordinary primary meaning of month, when used in instruments such as leases, was and is lunar month. This meaning is taken to be intended by the parties to any such instrument unless that instrument read as a whole, or the surrounding contemporaneous circumstances, show that the other, or secondary meaning, of calendar month, was, in fact, intended. It will, no doubt, surprise many people to learn that a rule as archaic as this surely is and so far removed from the needs and uses of modern society should still be part of our law. Even in the days of Charles Dickens, the rule was probably sufficiently out of date to justify Mr. Bumble’s description of the law. Today, its continued existence as a rule of the common law is opposed to all common sense and indicates how much remains to be done by way of reform to bring the common law up to date.

You learn something new every day! Or should that be every 1/29th of a lunar month (Approx. Maths is not my thing)

Discovery, Implied Undertakings and Contempt of Court. A Conor McGregor Saga.

The headlines have been dominated this week by Conor McGregor and the case against him by Ms Nikita Hand where Italian news articles indicate an ‘imminent publication’ of the Discovery from the case.

In November 2024, Ms Hand won her claim for damages and was awarded just shy of €250,000 damages against Mr McGregor on foot of the jury verdict where they found that he had raped Ms Hand six years ago.

McGregor’s legal team have indicated that they intend to appeal against the decision.

Whilst much focus has been made on the legal costs, which is an eye watering 1.3million Euro, the legal principles surrounding Discovery in Ireland is also gathering media attention.

 

Background

 

Lawyers for Ms Hand and Mr McGregor made representations relating to key CCTV evidence which showed Ms Hand in the Beacon Hotel, Sandyford, Dublin.

The material was gathered by An Garda Siochana and supposedly her demeanour in the CCTV footage was one of the factors that prompted the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) not to bring criminal charges.

It was provided by An Garda Siochana on foot of a High Court order for preparing for and litigating the civil case.

It was shown several times during the case and was the subject of media coverage.

Lawyers for Ms Hand had sought assurances that Mr McGregor would not disseminate the material after newspapers reported on social media comments that claimed the footage would be released this month.

The comments were attributed to Gabriel Ernesto Rapisardo, who Justice Owens said was a business associate of Mr McGregor.

Ray Boland SC for Ms Hand said Mr McGregor intended to disseminate selected pieces of the evidence with a view to “undermining and discrediting” the findings of the court.

Remy Farrell SC, for Mr McGregor said such an order was not necessary as there was already an implied undertaking that material for the case would not be misused or disseminated.

Justice Owens stated that “such leaking would be a gross contempt of Court.”

 

Discovery and Implied Undertakings

 

Discovery is a pre-trial procedure where parties to a lawsuit can obtain evidence from each other. The purpose is to prevent surprises during the trial and ensure that both sides have access to all relevant information.

The Discovery process in Ireland is governed by Order 31, of the Rules of the Superior Courts though our office has also written about alternative means for Discovery.

Documents and information, in this case CCTV Footage obtained by way of discovery in litigation are subject to an implied undertaking that they will not be used other than for the purposes of the proceedings in which they are concerned.

I.e. McGregor and his legal representatives are prohibited from using the CCTV for any other purpose other than the Defence of the civil claim brought against him by Ms Nikita Hand.

The implied undertaking is owed to the court.  Such discovery may not be used to found other causes of action. The law in Ireland is therefore broadly similar to that of NI.

The rationale underpinning the undertaking was explored in Greencore Group plc v Murphy, where Keane J highlighted that it was an invasion of private rights, constituted by discovery:

“The order requiring the production of…documents is an invasion of the right of the person against whom the order is made to keep his documents to himself and it is for this reason that the Court will ensure that documents are not used for any purposes other than the purpose of the particular legal proceedings in which they are produced by making the order for production subject to that implied undertaking.”

Leaking of documents/information would constitute a breach of undertaking.

In the current case Justice Owens confirmed that it would be a gross breach of Ms Hand’s privacy adding that “the material would quickly spread on the internet and reach the furthest corners of that dark hole”.

The undertaking survives notwithstanding that any discovery obtained is often used in open court.  In this case the CCTV footage was show several times during the case and was the subject of significant media coverage.  The fact that there is an inevitable degree of publicity does not justify widespread dissemination of the material for an ulterior purpose.

 

Breaching Implied Undertakings in Discovery in Irish case Law

 

Tobin v. Minister for Defence [2019] IESC 57 highlighted the importance of the discovery process in ensuring fair civil proceedings while acknowledging potential burdens.

Implications of breaching an implied undertaking were explored in the Irish Supreme Court case of Waterford Credit Union v. J & E Davy [2020] IESC 9 where both the High Court and Court of Appeal, whilst finding documentation to be relevant and necessary, denied discovery citing a breach of the implied undertaking by Waterford’s solicitor in separate proceedings, which had improperly used information obtained during discovery.

Upon appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeal’s decision, holding that the breach of the implied undertaking by Waterford’s solicitor in unrelated proceedings should not prevent the discovery of relevant and necessary documents in the current case. The Supreme Court emphasized the primary duty of ensuring substantive justice and maintaining the integrity of the discovery process over procedural technicalities involving breaches by legal representatives in separate instances.

 

Contempt of Court in Ireland

 

Justice Owens in this case confirmed that there was a “real and demonstrable risk” that the footage would be disseminated and, if that happened, it would be a breach of the implied undertaking not to misuse the material and would constitute civil contempt of Court.

Contempt of court is refers to any behaviour or action that disrespects, disobeys or challenges the authority, justice system and dignity of the work of the courts. It protects the administration of justice by ensuring that court orders are obeyed and that courts can run smoothly.

In Ireland, contempt of court remains on a common law footing.  This is in contrast to NI where it is enshrined in legislation through the Contempt of Court Act 1981.  Indeed the Supreme Court in Ireland has been calling for contempt-of-court legislation for some time. In Kelly v O’Neill ([2000] 1 IR 354), Keane J said that “our law in this area is, in many respects, uncertain and in need of clarification by legislation”.

Order 44 of the Rules of the Superior Courts provides that those in contempt of a court order can be attached (arrested) and committed to jail, but it doesn’t specify what “contempt” is.

The Law Reform Commission published a Consultation on Contempt of Court in July 1991 under which it recommended legislative codification on the law in this area, but as of 2025 the closest we have seen to codification is the Contempt of Court Bill 2017, which may have gained traction again if its sponsor, Josepha Madigan, had been re-elected.  

In Irish Bank Resolution Corp Ltd v Quinn and Ors [2012] IESC 51, the Supreme Court commented that the law of contempt of court was amorphous and extremely difficult for the layperson to understand and could be unclear even to judges and lawyers.

The Judge even referred to the position in NI in stating;

 “It is 20 years now since the Law Reform Commission urged the need for statutory reform in this area, and some 31 years since such reform took place by statute in the neighbouring jurisdiction. It is most unfortunate that no positive steps have been taken here, with the result that this fraught matter has come on for resolution in an uncertain state of the law.”

It is understood that the Law Reform Commission continues to consider the matter, but due to the urgency of other work in hand, its report on contempt is not expected to be published until late 2025.

Minister for Justice Helen McEntee has stated that the publication of this final report is awaited before her department considers any changes to this complex area of law.

 

Dealing with Contempt

 

An infamous line that any UFC fans attribute to Mr McGregor comes to mind, “You’ll do nothing.” 

Another is ‘I’d like to apologise…to absolutely nobody.’

In dealing with Civil Contempt, there is the question of the appropriate order, if any, on foot of any finding of contempt.

Such orders may include, but are not limited to custodial orders, but may also include financial orders.  This is against a backdrop of Justice Owens referring to Mr McGregor as ‘one of the wealthiest men in the country.’ 

The Judge considered social media posts in which Mr McGregor was said to have “scandalised the court” after the jury’s verdict where he referred to Ms Hand as a liar and the court as a ‘kangaroo court’.  He indicated that any action at that stage would only give oxygen and more publicity.  He opted to take no action on the “kangaroo court” comments as it would be a “distraction” and “only keep him in the news cycle”.

Justice Owens has indicated it was necessary to ‘nip this in the bud’ and directed Mr McGregor to return ‘all fobs or sticks’ containing the footage to his solicitor and arrange the permanent deletion of the files from computers and phones within one week.

The judge also directed him to make an affidavit indicating what copies had been made and how they were deleted.

 

 

Understanding Liability in James v Halliday [2024] IEHC 281

The recent Irish High Court decision in James v Halliday [2024] IEHC 281 has sparked discussions about road safety and liability apportionment in accidents involving agricultural vehicles. This case, decided on May 8, 2024, addressed a tragic collision between Darren James (the Plaintiff), a delivery driver, and a tractor driven by the deceased William Wilson (the Defendant).

Central to the judgment was the question of negligence and how liability should be divided between the parties.

 

Case Background and Circumstances

 

The accident occurred on January 12, 2018, on the N14 road between Lifford and Letterkenny in Ireland. The Plaintiff was driving at speeds of 60–70 mph on a wet and winding road.  The tractor, operated by the Defendant, lacked a legally mandated amber flashing beacon.

The collision unfortunately resulted in the Defendant’s death and significant injuries to the Plaintiff.

 

Principles of Liability

 

The Court in determining liability, outlined the well-established principles of negligence:

  • Duty of Care: Both parties owed a duty of care to operate their vehicles safely and in accordance with traffic regulations.
  • Breach of Duty:
    • The defendant breached this duty by failing to comply with lighting regulations, which are critical for ensuring visibility.
    • The plaintiff breached his duty by not adapting his driving speed to the road and weather conditions.
  • Causation: Both breaches contributed directly to the collision.

The Court opted to apportion liability having reference to the relative severity and impact of each parties actions.

The High Court determined the following;

 

Negligence by the Defendant:

 

The court held the estate of the Defendant, 75% liable for the accident in circumstances where the Defendant’s failure to illuminate his tractor with a yellow flashing beacon was deemed a “severe breach of duty.”

 

Contributory Negligence of the Plaintiff:

 

The Plaintiff was found 25% liable for driving at an inappropriate speed for the conditions, even though he was within the legal limit.  The court noted that the road’s wet and winding nature required greater caution, which the Plaintiff failed to exercise

The role of Yellow Beacons

 

This case highlights the significance of S.I. No. 354/2015 – Road Traffic (Construction and Use of Vehicles) Regulations.

The purpose of these beacons as outlined by the Revised standards of the Road Safety Authority for Agricultural Vehicles are to warn other road users that they are approaching a slow-moving or large vehicle.

These beacons enhance visibility, particularly in low-light or adverse conditions. The failure to use this safety feature was a critical factor in the court’s decision, as it significantly reduced the tractor’s visibility, making the accident foreseeable and preventable.

 

Considerations for future Liability Disputes

 

This judgment sets a clear precedent for how courts may handle liability in similar cases:

  1. Enhanced Scrutiny on Agricultural Vehicles: Operators of such vehicles must comply with all safety regulations, knowing that non-compliance can result in substantial findings of liability.
  2. Reinforcement of Contributory Negligence Principles: Drivers of other vehicles are also expected to adapt their behaviour to prevailing conditions, even if they are not the primary cause of an accident.
  3. Judicial Focus on Safety Standards: The court’s decision underscores the importance of ongoing regulatory compliance as a cornerstone of road safety.

 

Conclusion

 

The High Court’s ruling in James v Halliday serves as a crucial reminder of the responsibilities shared by all road users. The decision emphasises that adherence to safety regulations, such as the use of yellow beacons, is not merely a legal formality but a vital measure to prevent accidents. By apportioning liability between the parties, the court sent a clear message: negligence on the part of one does not absolve others from their duty to exercise caution.

This case will likely influence future legal considerations in Ireland, reinforcing the critical link between compliance, visibility, and liability in road traffic law.

 

Court of Appeal Ruling: Claim for Credit Hire Can Proceed Despite Expired MOT

In the case of Ali v HSF Logistics Polska SP. Zo.o [2024] EWCA Civ 1479, the Court of Appeal delivered a crucial judgment that has wide implications for claims involving credit hire costs, particularly when the Plaintiff’s vehicle did not have a valid MOT certificate at the time of the accident.

This case addresses the legal complexities around the principle of mitigation and whether the failure to renew an MOT certificate should prevent a Plaintiff from recovering credit hire charges.

 

MOT delays in Northern Ireland

 

MOT delays were already prevalent in NI prior to the COVID-19 pandemic.  In 2020 BBC NI highlighted that faults had been found on 48 out of 55 lifts and that MOT tests were due to be cancelled.

This, coupled with an increasing population, a higher proportion of households with access to a vehicle as well as older vehicles on the road all has resulted in significant delays in MOT testing in NI. Infrastructure Minister for NI Mr John O’Dowd in 2024 outlined an increasingly high demand for MOT tests and confirmed that 1.1 million tests had been carried out in 2023/24.  The highest numbers ever recorded.

 

MOT, Credit Hire and the position in Northern Ireland.

 

Insurers in Northern Ireland are therefore well used to these cases where the Plaintiff’s vehicle did not have a valid MOT at the time of the collision but the Plaintiff sought to recover Credit Hire charges.  Morgan v Bryson Recycling Limited and Magill v Donnelly are two cases that come to mind.

Ultimately up until Ali it was held that a court should take a broad view of the circumstances of each case and conduct a case specific inquiry in each case.  For example, a case where the MOT expired a number of years before the accident would be treated differently that a case where the MOT Certificate expired days before the accident.

 

Case Background: The Dispute Over Credit Hire Costs

 

Majid Ali’s vehicle was parked when it was hit by the Defendant’s vehicle.  The Plaintiff, sought to recover over £21,500 from a UK insurer – acting as claims handler for a Polish insurer.

The Plaintiff’s vehicle however did not have a valid MOT certificate at the time of the accident and the certificate had expired four and a half months earlier.

This raised the question of whether the Plaintiff was legally entitled to recover the hire costs, given that his vehicle was not roadworthy.

The usual battlegrounds for Credit Hire cases were, most helpfully, agreed by the Plaintiff and Defendant;

  • The Plaintiff needed to hire a vehicle.
  • The length of hire was reasonable.
  • The type of car hired was reasonable.
  • The Plaintiff was not impecunious.
  • The Defendant did not provide any alternative rate evidence

Furthermore, it was not in dispute that the MOT had expired four and a half months before the road traffic accident nor was there any evidence or suggestion that the Plaintiff intended to obtain a new MOT certificate.

At the County Court level, the Plaintiff’s claim for the hire costs was dismissed on the basis of causation.   That is to say, Majid Ali could not establish that the road traffic accident had, as a matter of law, caused any loss because he had lost the ability to drive a non-roadworthy vehicle only, which he was not legally permitted to use on the road.

The decision was upheld by the High Court and Ali appealed to the Court of Appeal.

The key issue on appeal was whether the lower courts were correct in dismissing the claim for credit hire costs on the grounds of legal causation and the failure to mitigate loss, considering the vehicle could not have been legally driven due to the expired MOT.

 

The Court of Appeal’s Judgment

 

The Court of Appeal revisited and applied earlier case law, notably Hewison v Meridian Shipping [2002] EWCA Civ 1821, and concluded that the minor criminal offence of failing to maintain an MOT certificate should not bar the claimant from recovering credit hire charges.

He disagreed with the Defendant’s submissions that the Plaintiff had suffered no “loss” as a result of the accident.  He relied on Beechwood Birmingham Ltd v Hoyer Group UK Ltd [2010] EWCA Civ 647 is asserting that;

A claimant’s loss is the lack of advantage and inconvenience caused by not having the use of a car ready at hand and at all hours for personal and/or family use.  [The accident] causes the claimant to be deprived of the use of an item of property, which causes inconvenience in the form of inability to use it for private transport. The fact that a claimant does not have a valid MOT certificate for the car does not alter the fact that they have been deprived of its use or the fact that this deprivation would have caused inconvenience but for the hiring.

The absence of a valid MOT certificate was irrelevant to the fact that the Plaintiff was deprived of his vehicle and required a replacement.

Lord Justice Stuart-Smith acknowledged that driving without an MOT certificate is a criminal offence, punishable by a fine of up to £1,000. However, he classified this as a relatively minor infraction, which should not bar recovery of credit hire costs. He noted that the court’s role was to address the direct consequences of the defendant’s negligence – in this case, the loss of the use of the vehicle – and not the minor collateral offence of an expired MOT.

The minor nature of the illegality in this case was insufficient to prevent recovery of the hire charges. The court revisited and reapplied referenced Hewison in stating that a court should not deprive a Plaintiff of damages merely due to a collateral or insignificant illegal act, such as the expired MOT.

Thus, while I would accept that allowing the claim for hire charges in the present case may just about be said to tend towards being harmful to the integrity of the legal system, any harm is in my view strictly limited, leading clearly to the conclusion that it would be disproportionate to have refused the Claimant’s claim on the grounds of ex turpi causa.

 

Broader Legal Implications

 

This ruling has significant implications for both Plaintiffs and Insurers in the context of credit hire claims namely:

  1. Minor Traffic Offences Do Not Automatically Bar Claims: The court established that driving a vehicle without MOT was a relatively minor traffic violation on par with having defective windscreen wipers, or a defective lamp, or a non-conforming number plate and it should not preclude a claimant from recovering credit hire costs.
  2. Causation and Mitigation of Loss: The court clarified that the absence of a valid MOT certificate does not alter the fact that the Plaintiff’s loss – the inability to use the vehicle due to the accident – was caused by the defendant’s negligence. As a result, the claimant was entitled to recover the costs for a replacement hire vehicle.
  3. Potential for Future Cases: Although the Court of Appeal ruled in favour of the Plaintiff, it acknowledged that there may be cases in the future where more serious traffic offences – such as driving without insurance or with dangerous tyres – could potentially bar a claim or result in a reduction of damages. However, in this case, the court accepted that the failure to renew the MOT certificate was a minor offence and did not warrant a reduction in the claimant’s recovery.

 

Conclusion

 

The Ali v HSF Logistics case draws a conclusion under the long history of this case and similar cases involving a lack of MOT. However, “yet another skirmish-cum-battle in the overall “secular war” between the credit hire industry and defendants’ insurers” continues.

Contact Ruaidhri Austin, Partner in charge of Lacey Solicitors Credit Hire team if you have any questions or require legal advice in any similar cases.

 

The Appeal of the Court

By Damian McGeady.

The Case of O’Daly

On the 8th June 2016, Mr O’Daly was cycling on the quay, near Dublin’s Custom House, when a passing bus caused him to fall, fracturing the bank official’s elbow and spraining his ankle. Several years on, and after a contested action where liability was disputed, a High Court Judge awarded him €100,000 General Damages for pain and suffering. Last week, the Court of Appeal reduced that award for General Damages to €55,000.

Teething

At the time of the incident in June 2016, the Court of Appeal was cutting its teeth, having been constituted in late 2014. In Payne v Nugent in November 2015, Irvine J. delivered a judgement which reduced an award by Mr Justice Cross. The Court decreed that awards must be reasonable having regard to the injuries sustained, that they must also be proportionate to the awards commonly made to victims in respect of injuries which are of significantly greater or lesser import. That modest injuries should attract moderate damages. A few months before Mr O’Daly’s brush with a bus, the Court of Appeal in Nolan v Wirenski addressed the jurisdiction of an appellate court to overturn an award of damages, reducing an assessment of damages by Barr J. from €100,000 to €65,000.

A Recalibration?

Weeks later, Mr & Mrs Shannon had their damages awarded by Donnelly J. in the High Court, substantially reduced by the Court of Appeal. In a separate Judgement on Costs in the action, the Court of Appeal refused to accept the submission by Counsel on behalf of the Appellants that the recent Court of Appeal decisions amounted to a recalibration of assessment of General Damages.

Along the Quays

Two weeks on from Mr O’Daly’s accident and just along the Quays at the Four Courts, a Miss Cronin, who had previously been awarded €180,000 damages for injuries by Cross J., was being told that her award for injuries sustained as a taxi passenger in an accident at Harold’s Cross, was being reduced by €75,000.

Murphy’s Just Award

Sandwiched between the two decisions, and proving that recalibration had not occurred, was the decision in Murphy v County Galway Motor Club. Mr Murphy, a spectator at a rally event where a car left the road and struck him, suffered dreadful injuries. The Court raised the assessment of McGovern J. on General Damages from €200,000 to €275,000. It also set aside a finding of contributory negligence. Whilst the decision in Murphy favoured the injured party and justly raised the award, there is a definite sense that the Appellate Court had a calming effect on Damages since its formation. Up until then it was often very difficult to predict levels of awards in the High Court. Advice to insurers would often be couched with the proviso, that much depended on the identity of the Judge hearing the case.

Discourse, debate and dispute

More recently, in McKeown v Crosby, the Court of Appeal reduced an award from €70,000 to €35,000. In doing so it referenced the public discourse, debate and dispute relating to the personal injury damages. In Griffin v Hoare, General Damages were reduced by the majority of the Court from €155,000 to €120,000. In Quinn v Masivlaniec, the Court reduced damages for pain and suffering from €210,000 to €175,000. In Leidig v O’Neill, General Damages were reduced from €155,000 to €90,000.

The Court, on occasion, has refused to interfere with the High Court’s assessment of Damages in Zhang v Farrell, and O’Sullivan v Brozda.

Just days ago, the High Court reduced an award for psychiatric damage in the case of Zagananczyk.

Working

Next year there will be ten candles on the Court of Appeal cake. It’s formation and the approach that it has adopted to the assessment of General Damages for personal injuries is by now well-rehearsed. Reasonableness and proportionality are key to it’s approach. That is to be welcomed in a landscape where up to it’s formation, awards were much more volatile and unpredictable. Volatility and unpredictability are unwelcome in the Insurance world. The Court of Appeal is working.

Court of Appeal Reduces Award for Psychiatric Injury

What is the correct method of valuing psychiatric injury under the new Guidelines?

A blog by Damian McGeady

The Court of Appeal has given further guidance on the methods of valuing Psychiatric Injury under the new Guidelines. In the Zagananczyk case, the Court upheld the Appeal of the Defendant’s, reducing the High Court award of €90,000 damages for general damages to one of €60,000.

In the High Court, the Trial Judge accepted that the Plaintiff had suffered from PTSD in the lower end of the serious category, finding a figure of €45,000 to be appropriate. The Court accepted that the Plaintiff also suffered separately, an identified and diagnosed Psychological Injury in the form of an alcohol abuse disorder and depression, which the Court categorised as being at the lower end of moderate and for which the Court allowed €20,000 damages.

Thus the High Court’s award for Psychiatric Injury totalled €65,000. The High Court allowed an additional figure of €25,000 for burns and scarring.

The Appeal

The Defendants argued that the Trial Judge erred in classifying the PTSD as serious and that the Judge was wrong to separately award two different sums for Psychiatric Injury. In addition, the Defendants argued that the Judge’s award for scarring was excessive.

Applying the Guidelines

The Court of Appeal identified the decision of Coffey J. in Lipinski (a minor) v Whelan as helpful analysis, not just in valuing Psychiatric Injury, but in applying an uplift for lesser injuries. The Court also referred to and commended the decision of Murphy J. in McHugh v Ferol. In that action the Court, having established the value of the dominant injury went on to value each additional and lesser injury, totting the values up before applying a discount to the lesser injuries. In McHugh the discount was 50%.

Reality Check

In his Judgement in the Court of Appeal in Zagananczyk, Noonan J. said;

Whatever mathematical approach is adopted, it is important not to lose sight of the global impact of all the injuries on the particular plaintiff concerned. The plaintiff is entitled to be compensated for all the suffering they have endured, be it from one or ten discreet injuries suffered at the same time. As the Guidelines suggest, some assistance may be derived from a consideration of how the overall award compares with other individual categories in the Guidelines. If an obvious mismatch emerges, this may suggest that the requisite proportionality has not been achieved. That is, in my view a useful exercise in the present case as appears further below and can provide a helpful “reality check”.

The Assessment on Appeal

The Court of Appeal held that the High Court had made a number of errors in it’s approach to the assessment of damages for Psychiatric Injury. The Court noted that the Guidelines define PTSD as including mood disorder and that depression was a mood disorder. Applying the analysis of Coffey J in Lipinski, the Court of Appeal found that the Trial Judge had erred in reaching a classification that the Plaintiff’s PTSD was “serious”. It found that a cumulative award for Psychiatric Injury in the case of €65,000 clearly offended the doctrine of proportionality, reducing the award to €35,000, stating:

Although in my view the PTSD in Lipinski was of a more serious order than in the present case, nonetheless when one factors in the depression and alcohol abuse, even assuming they were to be regarded as separate, I think, as in Lipinski, an award of damages at the top end of the moderate category is justified at €35,000.

Whilst The Court found it unsatisfactory that the High Court Judge had not indicated how the uplift was applied to in the case of burns and scarring, the Court of Appeal did not consider that the Defendant had established an error on the part of The Judge in arriving at a figure of €25,000 for scarring.

The Court of Appeal reduced the award for general damages from €90,000 to €60,000.

High Court Procedure. Should a Summons be heard?

Appeal finds that High Court ought to have heard Summons brought by Defendant rather than adjourn it generally.

by Damian McGeady

In Sherry v Murphy & Ors, the Court of Appeal heard an appeal from a judgement and Order of the High Court, the substance and effect of which was to refuse to fix a date for the hearing of a motion brought on behalf of a Defendant who challenged the adequacy of a Personal Injury Summons. The defendant sought several orders based on the alleged failure of the personal injuries summons to comply with High Court Procedure and the requirements of Part 2 of the Civil Liability and Courts Act, 2004.

When the motion was called counsel for the defendant asked for a date to be fixed for the hearing of the motion. This was opposed by counsel for the plaintiff who argued that the progress of the case was impeded by the fact that the first defendant had not delivered his defence and was seeking to have his defence assessed by way of a motion. The judge ruled that he should first deliver his defence and then bring his motion, which could be dealt with alongside the hearing of the action. The judge declined an application by counsel for the plaintiff to strike out the motion but rather adjourned it generally and reserved the costs.

The Substance of the Appeal was that the High Court judge exercised his discretion to adjourn the motion generally – or not to assign a hearing date – in a manner which irredeemably prejudiced the defendant. It is said that the effect of the order was to irredeemably defeat the objectives of Part 2 of the Civil Liability and Courts Act, 2004 and that the order made failed to have regard to where the balance of justice lay.

The Court of Appeal held that the suggestion that that the effect of the order was to irredeemably defeat the objectives of the Act probably put it too high but, did find that the defendant had an argument to make that the requirements of the Act had not been met in the way the claim against him was pleaded.

In considering correct High Court procedure and allowing the Appeal and remitting the motion to the High Court for hearing the Court acknowledged the difficulty that Judges face in matters such as these.

“I acknowledge that in the management of busy lists and scarce resources a significant margin of appreciation must be afforded to the list judge but in my view, he was led into error by the summary of the issues. In my view, the refusal of the High Court judge to fix a date for the hearing of the motion created a substantial risk of significant procedural unfairness coupled with a likelihood that no effective remedial action could be put in place later to address the very significant additional costs to which the first defendant was exposed in the event that his application proved to be successful.”