The Supreme Court’s recent ruling in Kirwan v Connors & Ors [2025] IESC 21 brings much-needed clarity to how Irish courts handle inordinate and inexcusable delay in litigation. This landmark decision is especially significant for insurers, defendant solicitors, and claims handlers combating stale or inactive claims.

Background: A Decade of Delay

 

The underlying case in questionconcerned a professional negligence action by Mr Kirwan against his solicitor. Proceedings were initiated by Mr. Kirwan in 2013 however he did not progress his case for five years.  The Defendant brought an application to court in 2018 to have Mr Kirwan’s case dismissed for delay in prosecuting his claim pursuant to Order 122 Rule 11 of the Rules of the Superior Courts, and/or the inherent jurisdiction of the Court

The High Court agreed and dismissed Mr Kirwan’s case for inordinate and inexcusable delay. using the principles in Primor.  This decision was upheld on appeal to the Court of Appeal.

On final appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal, but used the opportunity to clarify the applicable principles and propose a more structured approach.

---

The Primor Principles: A Quick Recap

 

In the case of Primor Plc -v- Stokes Kennedy Crowley [1996] 2 IR 459 it was decided that the following three limbs must be taken into consideration in the context of delay:

• Is the litigation delay inordinate?

• Is the delay inexcusable?

• Does the balance of justice favour dismissal?

A balance was to be struck by the Courts in ensuring the Constitutional requirement that justice was administered effectively and expeditiously, and that procedural fairness was adhered to.

---

Kirwan Principles Now Applicable 

 

(Per O’Donnell C.J. at para. 26 – Kirwan v Connors & Ors[2024] IESC):

1. Inactivity < 2 Years

Until the point is reached where there has been inactivity for two years a claim should only be dismissed if the claim is an abuse of the process or there is prejudice to the defendant to the level required to ground an application under the O’Domhnaill v Merrick jurisdiction.

2. Inactivity ≥ 2 Years

After two years of total inactivity, a claim may be dismissed for want of prosecution. It is likely that a claim will only be dismissed at this point if in addition to the period of inactivity a plaintiff can point to some additional prejudice or other factor pointing towards dismissal. If a court does not dismiss the claim, it would be entitled to make strict case management directions on the basis that non-compliance with such directions would itself justify dismissal

3. Inactivity ≥ 4 Years

If there has been four years total inactivity then the claim should be dismissed if it is dependent on oral evidence so that the defendant is exposed to the risk of failing recollections and witness reluctance that inevitably accompanies a long effluxion of time, unless the plaintiff persuades the court that there are compelling reasons why the claim should not be dismissed and can be properly allowed to go to trial. Conversely, if there are factors such as specific prejudice to the defendant that will strengthen the case for dismissal, but it should be emphasised that it is not necessary to point to any such factor: passage of this amount of time is itself enough and the plaintiff should bear the onus of establishing that there are reasons that the case can properly proceed.

4. Inactivity ≥ 5 Years

Finally, where there has been a cumulative period of complete inactivity for more than five years…the court should have a generous power to dismiss cases, and the court should feel free to dismiss the proceedings unless satisfied that there is a pressing exigency of justice that requires that the case be permitted to go to trial. This would include exceptional situations in which the plaintiff faced educational social or economic disadvantage, or otherwise in progressing their action, in very unusual cases in the realm of public law where the proceedings disclose an issue the public interest demands should be litigated to conclusion or where there has been serious misconduct by the defendant in the course of the proceedings.

---

A Realistic View of Litigation Delay

 

Chief Justice O’Donnell reflected on the realities of litigation, cautioning against the idealistic view that every case should proceed to trial unless manifestly unfair.

He noted that:

“Many more claims are commenced than ever resolved… such claims are commenced for a range of reasons and not merely because a plaintiff considers that they have been injured…”

He acknowledged that litigation decisions are driven by cost, witness availability, and procedural strategy. Importantly, requiring a defendant to defend a case after years of inaction—even if theoretically still ‘fair’—may be fundamentally unjust.

This pragmatic view supports insurers and defence counsel seeking early dismissal in long-dormant files. The Court expressly recognised that delay alone can constitute prejudice, even where documentation remains intact.

---

Training for Insurers: Stay Ahead of the Curve

 

This decision provides significant procedural clarity for addressing stale claims and litigation delay. Defendant representatives dealing with dormant or stale files should apply the established thresholds to advise on strike-out prospects with their instructing insurers.

The Kirwan v Connors case does however stipulate that the test is not rigid but remains a matter of judicial discretion. It acknowledges that judges may have differing opinions in borderline cases, which is an inherent and necessary aspect of the legal system. The goal of the jurisprudence is not to dictate outcomes in marginal cases but to provide enough guidance to resolve most cases without lengthy hearings and appeals. This refinement of the Primor test aims to expedite decisions and focus on key issues in more balanced claims.

“In any other field of activity, two years is a very long time to do nothing. The administration of justice should not be different.”

Lacey Solicitors is an Irish Insurance law firm and we regularly deliver training sessions to insurers on the evolving legal and procedural landscape of insurance litigation on the entire island of Ireland.

If your team would benefit from a practical, up-to-date training on litigation tactics in Ireland, please use the Contact Us section of our website to arrange a training session.

 

 

In a decision with significant implications for motor and employer’s liability insurers, the Supreme Court provided much-needed clarification on what constitutes the “use” of a motor vehicle under Irish law. The case—Urban and Rural Recycling Ltd & RSA Insurance Ireland DAC v Zurich Insurance plc [2024] IESC 43—examined the boundaries of Section 56 of the Road Traffic Act 1961, with the Court ultimately holding that an employer’s liability to an injured employee, arising from the operation of a stationary vehicle during the course of employment, falls within the scope of compulsory motor insurance.

The ruling followed a successful appeal by RSA Insurance, which had declined indemnity on the basis that its employer’s liability policy excluded claims covered under the Road Traffic Acts. The core legal question before the Court was whether such liability ought to have been covered under the company’s motor policy with Zurich.

---

Case Background

Mr. Joseph Moore, an employee of Urban and Rural Recycling Ltd, suffered catastrophic injuries in 2013 when a bin fell and struck him on the head while he was operating a lifting mechanism on a recycling truck. The truck, parked at the side of a public road, was owned and operated by the company as part of its normal business.

The company held:

• A motor fleet policy with Zurich Insurance, and
• An employer’s liability policy with RSA, which excluded liability falling under the Road Traffic Acts.

Both insurers denied liability, prompting a legal dispute to determine who was obliged to indemnify the employer for the €4.75 million settlement agreed with the injured employee.

---

Questions to be answered on Use of a Motor Vehicle Under Irish Insurance Law

The case turned on whether the employer’s liability fell within the scope of Section 56(1)(a) of the Road Traffic Act 1961, which prohibits the use of a vehicle in a public place without motor insurance that covers liability for injury caused by its negligent use.

The Supreme Court was asked to determine:

1. Whether a body corporate can be a “user” of a vehicle under the Act;
2. Whether an employer can be a user through the actions of an employee acting in the course of their duties;
3. Whether the operation of equipment on a stationary vehicle constitutes “use” within the meaning of Section 56.

---

Expanded Interpretation of ‘Use’ Under Irish and EU Law

 

Domestic Context (Road Traffic Act 1961)

Section 56(1)(a) of the RTA prohibits a person from using a vehicle in a public place unless they are insured against all sums they may be liable to pay as damages for injury caused by the negligent use of the vehicle.

Historically, “use” in Irish motor insurance law was often narrowly construed to mean driving or moving a vehicle. However, the Supreme Court has now confirmed that this view is no longer tenable, particularly in light of the European Motor Insurance Directives.

EU Law and Functional Approach to “Use”

In its judgment, the Court took a purposive approach, holding that the word “use” in this context is not limited to driving or road travel. Relying on the wording of the Directive 2009/103/EC and related EU case law, the Court reaffirmed that “use” includes any function consistent with the ordinary operation of the vehicle as a means of transport, including static functions such as loading.

This interpretation mirrors the Court of Justice of the European Union’s approach in several key cases, including Vnuk, Rodrigues de Andrade, and more recently Línea Directa Aseguradora SA v Segurcaixa (Case C-100/18), where a stationary vehicle that caught fire while parked in a private garage was deemed to be in “use” for the purpose of the Directive.

In Línea Directa, the CJEU held that a vehicle remains within the scope of compulsory insurance even when it is parked and not in motion, provided the vehicle is still being used in a manner consistent with its transport function. That principle was instrumental in shaping the Supreme Court’s reasoning.

---

Case Summary: Línea Directa Aseguradora SA v Segurcaixa [2019] (C-100/18)

In Línea Directa, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) addressed whether damage caused by a fire in a stationary vehicle (parked in a private garage and not moved for over 24 hours) fell within the meaning of “use of vehicles” under Article 3 of Directive 2009/103/EC.

Facts

• A car caught fire due to an electrical fault in a private garage, causing property damage.
• The insurer of the car (Línea Directa) denied liability, arguing that the vehicle was stationary and not in use.
• The ECJ was asked whether such a situation was covered by compulsory motor insurance.

ECJ Ruling

The Court held that:

• “Use” of a vehicle includes being parked between journeys, as parking is a natural and necessary step in the operation of a vehicle as a means of transport.
• The vehicle’s stationary status did not exclude it from the Directive’s scope.
• Fire caused by a part of the vehicle (e.g., electrical system) is within the remit of “use” if the vehicle is being used in accordance with its function as a means of transport.

This ruling has been explicitly cited by the Irish Supreme Court as a key influence in broadening the understanding of “use” to include operational functions of a stationary vehicle, such as waste loading in Urban and Rural Recycling.

---

Supreme Court Decision

The Supreme Court determined:

• The company was a user of the vehicle through the actions of its employee.
• There is no requirement in the legislation that “user” must refer to a natural person.
• Multiple users can exist simultaneously. A user (the employer) may be liable to another user (the employee) if their negligence causes injury.

The lift mechanism was part of the vehicle’s ordinary equipment and its operation formed part of the vehicle’s normal function in waste collection. On this basis, the Court concluded that the injury arose from the negligent “use” of the vehicle within the meaning of Section 56.

Since RSA’s employer’s liability policy specifically excluded Section 56 Liabilities, Zurich—as the motor insurer—was held responsible for providing indemnity.

---

Legislative Criticism and Call for Clarity on Use of a Motor Vehicle Under Irish Insurance Law

In delivering the judgment, the Court also addressed broader concerns about the legal framework for compulsory motor insurance in Ireland. Section 56, it noted, was not designed with EU obligations in mind, and subsequent amendments have not sufficiently modernised it. The piecemeal development of this area of law, in the Court’s view, poses a real risk of non-compliance with European directives.

The Court issued a clear call for legislative reform, warning that if Irish law fails to align fully with the Directive, the State may ultimately be exposed to liability for compensating victims where insurers would otherwise be responsible.

“A complete and coherent legislative overhaul of the compulsory motor insurance obligation is long overdue.”
— Murray J.

---

Practical Implications for Insurers

 

Motor Insurers

The decision confirms that motor policies must be prepared to respond to a broader range of risks than previously assumed. Claims involving injuries during the stationary use of a vehicle—especially involving operational equipment—may fall within compulsory insurance.

Employer’s Liability Insurers

Insurers with exclusions for liability falling under the Road Traffic Acts can now rely with greater confidence on the enforceability of those provisions in similar contexts.

Brokers and Claims Management

This case underlines the importance of clarity in policy drafting and risk allocation across multi-policy programmes. In sectors involving regular vehicle-based operations (e.g. waste management, construction, logistics), policyholder education and internal claims coordination will be essential.

---

Conclusion

The Urban and Rural Recycling case marks a welcome and authoritative moment in the interpretation of use of a motor vehicle under Irish insurance law. By aligning more closely with evolving EU jurisprudence, it ensures greater protection for victims, clearer delineation of insurance liabilities, and sets the stage for overdue legislative reform.

Insurers, brokers, and corporate policyholders should act now to audit and align policy language, claims handling practices, and underwriting assumptions with this broadened scope of what it means to “use” a motor vehicle under Irish and EU law.

Lacey Solicitors is an all-island Insurance law firm and we regularly deliver training sessions to insurers on the evolving legal and procedural landscape of motor insurance in Ireland. These sessions are available both in person and online, tailored to claims teams, legal departments, or senior handlers.

If your team would benefit from a practical, up-to-date session on policy, please use the Contact Us section of our website to arrange a training session.