IRL High Court ruled that monies paid out of “Dunnes Stores Management Pension and Life Assurance Scheme” were not to be deducted from the Plaintiff’s loss of earnings claim pursuant to s. 2 of the Civil Liability (Amendment ) Act 1964.

Monahan -v- Dunnes Stores & Ano

On the plaintiff’s behalf it was submitted that the payment which she received was payable by Friends First in respect of the injury which was the subject matter of wrongful act in the proceedings and was a payment that was paid under a contract of insurance which therefore was a sum which was not deductible by virtue of the provisions of s. 2(a) of the Act. They relied on the decision of Geoghegan J. in Greene v. Hughes Haulage [1998] 1 ILRM 34, a case in which the wording of s. 2 of the Act was considered.

In that case, the plaintiff’s employer, Elan Corporation, had an Employee Benefit Plan in place designed to provide its employees with certain pension, early retirement and death in service benefits. The Employee Benefit Plan also entitled its members to certain income benefits in the event of prolonged disability. The latter benefit, which was described as the “Disability Benefit Plan”, was operated by way of separate arrangement from the other benefits under an Employee Benefit Plan and was governed by a policy of insurance made between Elan and Irish Life. Geoghegan J. decided that the payments made under the Disability plan were not deductible against the plaintiff’s loss of earnings claim and that it was immaterial that she had not been a party to the contract. It was a contract that had been made for her benefit and was therefore to be considered as part of her overall remuneration such that she should be considered to have indirectly contributed to the premium.

In applying the authority, Irvine J stated “integral to both schemes is the fact that the policy was taken out for the benefit of the employee who might become disabled. Accordingly, I see no reason not to apply the principles outlined in Greene to the present case.”

The full judgement can be read here:

S.Major, Lacey Solicitors

IRL High Court dismisses a claim under Section 26 of the Civil Liability and Courts Act 2004.

Salako -v- O’Carroll

Peart J, in his ruling, stated that there was no injustice in doing so, due to the lack of truth and attempts to mislead the court in the evidence given by the Plaintiff, a national of Toga, referring to her as “a very poor historian.”

Despite reporting back and neck pain, and the need to use a crutch on an intermittent basis, video footage obtained by private investigators showed the Plaintiff only making use of the crutch on days when she had medical appointments arranged by the Defendants which, along with the multiple inconsistencies and inaccuracies in her evidence, was enough to satisfy the Judge that dismissing the claim under the 2004 act would not be unjust.

The full judgement can be read here:

S.Major, Lacey Solicitors

IRL High Court ruled plaintiff was 65% contributorily negligent in a difficult road traffic accident case.

Donohoe -v- Killeen

Hogan J stated that the case was of considerable difficulty to the court, due to the absence of independent third party evidence. Both forensic engineering experts who gave evidence agreed that it was almost impossible to determine by reference to some objective facts – such as, for example, an examination of the collision damage to the vehicles – which of the vehicles collided into the other.

In making his determination, the Judge attempted to determine what the most likely sequence of events was. Given that the Court knew that one of the drivers had broken the lights,and that both vehicles were travelling at modest speed, he stated that this suggested that the driver who broke the lights did so inadvertently.

He ruled therefore that the plaintiff who was driving on a complex roundabout with awkward traffic sequences, had just come through an amber light at the second stop and was now facing a third set of traffic lights within the space of about 120m was the most likely one to have broken the lights. He stated however that if the defendant had kept a complete and proper look-out, he would – or, at least, might – have seen the plaintiff’s vehicle approaching and could have used the available few seconds to sound the horn or otherwise take evasive action. In that respect, therefore, there was, objectively speaking, a degree of fault on the part of the defendant, even if the degree of fault attributable to the plaintiff was greater than that applicable to the defendant.

The full judgement can be read at:

S.Major, Lacey Solicitors